Hungary’s diplomatic network has expanded well beyond what its foreign policy priorities, institutional capacity, and professional standards can reasonably sustain. Any serious reform of the foreign ministry will have to address not only questions of cost, but also the structure, purpose, and staffing logic of its global presence.
The End of Hungary’s “Opening to the East”. For years, Viktor Orbán’s government sold the East as Hungary’s economic future and the West as a fading dependency. But the trade numbers never supported the fantasy and after Tisza’s landslide victory, the political system that sustained it may be starting to collapse as well.
The port project in Trieste is being overseen not by the transport or economic ministry, but by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (KKM). Since then, the state-run structure has produced three loss-making companies, operating costs worth billions of forints, and an investment project that keeps slipping year after year.
Presented as an instrument of soft power, Hungary’s teqball diplomacy raises deeper questions about transparency, political priorities, and the use of public money in foreign policy.
Power, Patronage and Hidden Wealth Behind Hungary’s Diplomacy
The classical diplomatic function of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has undergone a visible transformation in recent years. On the surface, the traditional elements of foreign policy still remain visible: ministerial flights to important and less important destinations around the world, the repeated announcement of new economic successes, the consular protection of supporters in stadiums and on trains, and the building of a peculiar foreign policy network referred to as “connectivity.”
In most foreign ministries, diplomatic travel is a logistical exercise. In Hungary’s, it has become a lifestyle genre. For years, insiders on Budapest’s Bem rakpart have whispered about the increasingly operatic travel requirements of the country’s foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó. Now, fresh accounts confirm that what masquerades as protocol is in fact the curated comfort regime of a man who behaves less like a public servant and more like a monarch in tracksuit diplomacy.
For more than a decade, Hungary has operated a parallel system within its foreign policy apparatus – a sprawling network of so-called foreign trade attachés (KGA), conceived as one of Minister Péter Szijjártó’s signature projects. Today, with 134 attachés stationed across 86 countries, the operation costs taxpayers an estimated 20 billion forints annually, a figure that invites the obvious question: what, exactly, does the Hungarian economy receive in return?
The honest answer is: very little.
The foreign service is one of the most important state institutions of any country. Embassies and consulates do far more than perform protocol duties: they represent economic interests, facilitate strategic information exchange, carry out cultural diplomacy, provide security assessments, and manage crisis situations. Foreign policy can only function with a stable, well-trained, and professional staff. This is why it becomes particularly striking when a country’s diplomatic system gradually—almost imperceptibly—loses its professional weight and becomes increasingly politicised.
When the Trump administration signed its Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) executive order in 2025, few doubted the measure would shake global pharmaceutical markets. By tying U.S. drug prices to the lowest government-negotiated rates in Europe and Canada, the White House pitched the plan as relief for American patients at the pharmacy counter.
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