Power, Patronage and Hidden Wealth Behind Hungary’s Diplomacy

The classical diplomatic function of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has undergone a visible transformation in recent years. On the surface, the traditional elements of foreign policy still remain visible: ministerial flights to important and less important destinations around the world, the repeated announcement of new economic successes, the consular protection of supporters in stadiums and on trains, and the building of a peculiar foreign policy network referred to as “connectivity.”

Author: Dr. Georges Suha

At the same time, however, the tasks of embassies have increasingly narrowed to serving ministerial needs. Providing cars, arranging special procurements, setting up gyms, and handling protocol and logistical tasks: all this appears more and more to be replacing classical diplomacy. A good example of this was the Trump–Orbán meeting, where the Hungarian ambassador was not even present, and the role of the mission he headed was essentially limited to booking accommodation, organizing programs for pro-government media figures, and providing the technical support for the press event.

Photo credit: Gemini

The construction of the shadow structure

While the visible part of the foreign affairs apparatus has become increasingly focused on the direct service of the political leadership, significant wealth and institutional influence have accumulated in the less visible “back country” of the ministry, which remains almost unknown to the wider public. Based on the latest reports, the combined balance sheet total of the 14 state-owned background companies and 3 foundations linked to the ministry is in the range of 70–90 billion forints.

This amount is remarkable in itself. Most ministries have at most a few background institutions attached to them; in the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, however, an exceptionally extensive network has emerged, employing at least 750 full-time workers according to estimates. In other words, more people work in the companies of the foreign affairs background network than in the ministry’s entire domestic staff.

Salaries are also significantly higher, as these institutions formally belong to the “market sector,” while in the end they operate from public funds. Only estimates are available regarding the exact number of board members, supervisory board members, advisers, and experts, but this circle may represent several hundred additional beneficiaries. The companies and foundations are typically headed by leaders close to the NER (the “System of National Cooperation,” the Orbán government’s overarching political project and power structure, built around centralized loyalty, patronage, and institutional control), who, in exchange for their political loyalty, receive positions, substantial benefits, and institutional influence. Within this circle, diplomatic passports also appear as self-evident privileges.

The logic of the numbers

The size and weight of the network are also visible in the financial data. In 2024, the Hungarian Export Promotion Agency (HEPA) recorded revenues of 5.27 billion forints, while its balance sheet total also stood in the multi-billion-forint range. The Central European Economic Development Network (CED) recorded revenues of 1.64 billion forints in 2024, and its balance sheet total was likewise in the billions.

Debrecen International Airport Ltd., which belongs to the foreign ministry, reported revenues of 2.38 billion forints in 2023, and its balance sheet total can also be measured in several billions, partly due to real estate and airport infrastructure. Paks II. Ltd. alone has a balance sheet total exceeding 10 billion forints, while its revenue remains low due to the specific nature of project preparation. The PIP Central Danube Region Development Ltd., barely known to the wider public, had a balance sheet total of 7.8 billion forints and revenues of 1.28 billion forints in 2024.

Adria Port Ltd., which operates the questionably useful Italian “port project,” likewise has several billions in registered capital, while its annual after-tax profit did not even reach 2 million forints. The Hungarian Diplomatic Academy Ltd. has a balance sheet total of 3.2 billion forints, and its revenue is also in the multi-billion-forint range. The smaller companies and agencies — such as the firms linked to Pécs-Pogány Airport, Hunatom, Hungary Helps, or HIPA — operate on a smaller scale, but viewed in terms of the logic of the network as a whole, they too form part of the concentration.

Foundations, extracted assets, limited control

To this must be added the seemingly independent foundations, which in reality fit into the foreign affairs structure through close overlaps in personnel and supervision.

The Foundation for the Preservation of Central European Built Heritage manages approximately 20 billion forints in assets through share packages and real estate, while the balance sheet total of the Central European Education Foundation and the budget of the Democracy Center Public Foundation are in the range of several hundred million forints. Together, these foundations represent 20–25 billion forints in value, operating in a public-interest asset management form that partly removes the assets from direct state oversight.

Dual structure, dual function

This is how the full picture emerges. While the functions of the central organs and foreign missions are increasingly restricted to serving the needs of top leadership, an almost opaque economic network operates in the background. The abnormally large number of background companies, the presence of leaders close to the NER, the system of benefits, and the concentration of political influence together create a kind of shadow foreign ministry.

This structure may also be suitable for carrying out transactions that the government does not wish to present directly to the public. Diplomacy thus shows a double face: on the surface, protocol service and communication-driven spectacle; underneath, the concentration of assets worth billions and strategic projects that serve as instruments for the extension of political power.

Cover photo credit: Gemini

Dr. Georges Suha is an international relations specialist, former ambassador, and expert in consular affairs with deep expertise in Sub-Saharan Africa. He has held senior diplomatic positions and continues to contribute to academic and policy discourse as a university lecturer. With extensive political networks and first-hand regional experience, he offers a nuanced perspective on African affairs, diplomacy, and consular practice. A dual citizen of Hungary and France, he engages fluently across European and African contexts.

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