The Responsibility of Renewal
It appears that Viktor Orbán may soon withdraw from the front line of politics. It is therefore time for us, too, to reflect on what renewal means for us.
It appears that Viktor Orbán may soon withdraw from the front line of politics. It is therefore time for us, too, to reflect on what renewal means for us.
On April 12, Hungary voted, and since then young people, many of whom were voting for the first time, have been blamed. Based on earlier turnout rates, young people had not seemed interested in politics, yet this time a significant wave of mobilization took place. I found two possible reasons that may explain this shift, and in this article I examine the social, economic, and other conditions that produced this remarkable level of participation, as well as what shaped young people’s new political consciousness.
In Central and Eastern Europe, the question of social inclusion has remained a recurring policy challenge for decades. In communities facing structural disadvantage, interventions are often built around external programmes, financial support, and institutional solutions. Less often do initiatives emerge that seek to produce lasting change at the local level by relying on internal resources and community-based agency.
There can be no meaningful reconciliation in Hungary while Viktor Orbán remains untouched by legal and political accountability.
Historical vulnerability does not return in the same form, but regulatory uncertainty, fragile trust, and the erosion of long-term predictability can once again become a familiar social experience.
Post-transition compensation was not merely an economic issue, but also a test of trust, self-determination, and the promise of historical redress. In Hungary, however, the gap between legal settlement and the social sense of justice quickly gave way to disillusionment.
Presented as an instrument of soft power, Hungary’s teqball diplomacy raises deeper questions about transparency, political priorities, and the use of public money in foreign policy.
The Socio-Psychological Legacy of Collectivization in Hungary (1961–1990). The end of collectivization did not bring genuine resolution: the loss of land, forced adaptation, and unspoken fears left behind a mental legacy that remains visible today through family patterns and broader forms of social behaviour.
Power, Patronage and Hidden Wealth Behind Hungary’s Diplomacy
The classical diplomatic function of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has undergone a visible transformation in recent years. On the surface, the traditional elements of foreign policy still remain visible: ministerial flights to important and less important destinations around the world, the repeated announcement of new economic successes, the consular protection of supporters in stadiums and on trains, and the building of a peculiar foreign policy network referred to as “connectivity.”
This is the impression I drew from Peter Magyar’s speeches delivered in Szarvas and Bekescsaba.
It is important, however, to clarify a fundamental misunderstanding. Zelensky’s controversial statement in question was not directed at Hungarian society as a whole, as Peter Magyar interpreted it, but referred exclusively to Viktor Orban. If the political practice of presenting criticism directed at one individual as an attack on the entire nation sounds familiar, that is hardly accidental. This communication method has long been present in Hungarian political discourse, particularly when the prime minister or the government faces criticism.