Beyond Merz: Could Europe’s Political Right Reshape the Balance of Power in Brussels?

From Germany’s regional elections to the 2027 electoral cycle, Europe’s changing political landscape raises questions about the future of the EPP, a possible parliamentary realignment and Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission.

Editor’s Note: This article is the second instalment in CEA Magazine’s analytical series examining the political future of the CDU/CSU in Germany and Europe. Building on the first article’s analysis of Germany’s regional elections and Friedrich Merz’s political challenges, it explores how developments in Germany and other major EU member states could reshape the balance of power in the European Parliament, potentially triggering a mid-term parliamentary realignment and affecting the future of Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission. Read the first instalment here.

Author: Szilárd Szélpál

Germany’s recent regional elections have raised questions extending far beyond Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s political future. While the immediate consequences concern the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the country’s governing coalition and the approaching 2027 state elections, a broader European dimension deserves attention. The electoral calendar in France, Italy, Spain and Poland, combined with the political developments already taking place within the European Parliament, creates several possible pathways for changes in the European Union’s institutional and parliamentary relationships.

The central issue is not simply whether Europe’s established governing parties will lose electoral support. It is whether national political developments could encourage a reorganisation of the European Parliament’s political groups before the next European elections in 2029. Such a development could alter the relative size of parliamentary groups, affect the European People’s Party’s (EPP) negotiating position and change the political environment surrounding Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission.

Crucially, these developments need not follow the same timetable. National elections, changes of government and decisions concerning European parliamentary affiliations operate through different institutional mechanisms. Their interaction, rather than any single election result, provides the basis for examining the potential transformation of European politics during the remainder of the current parliamentary term.

Germany: From Regional Defeats to a Possible Federal Political Crisis

The results of Germany’s September regional elections provide the starting point for this analysis. In Saxony-Anhalt, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) secured a substantial electoral victory over the CDU. Two weeks later, in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the AfD again emerged as the largest party, while the CDU received only 4.9 per cent and failed to enter the state parliament. Berlin produced a different political outcome, with the Left Party winning the election and the CDU finishing second. These results illustrate the different political directions in which dissatisfaction with established parties has been expressed.¹

As examined in the previous article in this series, Merz responded to the electoral defeats by reaffirming his intention to remain chancellor and continue his reform programme. Nevertheless, the elections have renewed discussion about his leadership, the government’s economic policies and the CDU’s political direction. They also provide an important starting point for examining how future German political developments could interact with Europe’s changing parliamentary relationships.¹

Germany faces five further state elections in 2027. Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein will vote on 18 April, North Rhine-Westphalia on 25 April, Bremen on 30 May and Lower Saxony on 26 September. The electoral calendar places several important regional contests within a relatively short period, creating successive opportunities to examine the relationship between the CDU’s national leadership and its regional organisations.²

Available polling demonstrates considerable variation between these states. In North Rhine-Westphalia, a September 2026 survey recorded 29 per cent for the CDU, 22 per cent for the AfD and 18 per cent for the Greens. In Lower Saxony, another September survey placed the SPD at 26 per cent, the CDU at 22 per cent and the AfD at 21 per cent. Earlier surveys indicated different electoral distributions in Schleswig-Holstein and Saarland. These measurements represent voting intentions recorded at different times rather than projections of the eventual election results.³

The national polling environment adds another dimension. September 2026 federal surveys recorded substantial AfD support, alongside declining or comparatively lower levels of support for the CDU/CSU in several polls. Differences between polling organisations remain relevant, but the figures demonstrate the electoral circumstances in which the government and the CDU’s regional leaders are operating.⁴

A distinction must nevertheless be made between a crisis of party leadership and a change of government. Germany’s Basic Law provides for a constructive vote of no confidence, under which the Bundestag can replace the chancellor by electing a successor. Separately, a failed vote of confidence may initiate a process leading to the dissolution of parliament and an early federal election. Neither outcome automatically follows from regional election results or adverse opinion polls.⁵

An eventual early federal election, a replacement of the chancellor or a substantial revision of Germany’s governing arrangements could, however, influence discussions among European political parties. Such developments would alter the national political environment in which representatives of the CDU, AfD and other German parties negotiate their European relationships. This possibility introduces an important question: could a German political transformation become a catalyst for a broader reorganisation of the European Parliament during its current legislative term?

France: The 2027 Presidential Election and the European Council

France represents a different institutional dimension of Europe’s approaching electoral cycle. The country’s 2027 presidential election will determine Emmanuel Macron’s successor, since the French Constitution prevents him from seeking a third consecutive presidential term. The result will also determine who represents France in the European Council and participates in decisions concerning the EU’s principal institutional appointments.

A presidential opinion poll published by Ipsos BVA in September 2026 recorded substantial first-round support for Marine Le Pen. These figures establish the level of support measured in that survey, although they do not determine the identity of the eventual candidates or the second-round result. Le Pen’s legal proceedings concerning her eligibility introduce an additional consideration, while the possibility of Jordan Bardella becoming the Rassemblement National’s presidential candidate would require a different electoral assessment.⁶

The significance of France’s election extends beyond domestic party competition. Rassemblement National belongs to the Patriots for Europe, whose parliamentary relationship with the EPP differs from that of Macron’s political allies. A change in the French presidency would therefore have implications for the political discussions taking place within the European Council, particularly on matters involving European integration, migration, economic policy and international relations. The participating parties hold differing positions on these questions, including disagreements over European assistance to Ukraine.

However, even a change in France’s presidency would not directly redistribute French seats in the European Parliament. It would change the country’s political representation in the European Council and potentially affect subsequent negotiations concerning EU policy priorities and institutional appointments. Any corresponding parliamentary consequences would depend on separate political decisions.

Italy: A Government Spanning Three European Political Families

Italy illustrates the existing relationship between national coalition politics and European parliamentary affiliations. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia belongs to the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Matteo Salvini’s Lega is affiliated with the Patriots for Europe, and Forza Italia belongs to the EPP. These parties participate in the same national governing coalition while their representatives sit in different European political groups.⁷

This arrangement demonstrates that national political cooperation does not necessarily require European parliamentary unification. At the same time, it provides an established framework through which politicians affiliated with different European groups regularly participate in the same national government.

An SWG survey conducted between 9 and 14 September 2026 recorded 27 per cent for Fratelli d’Italia, 20.9 per cent for the Democratic Party, 12.6 per cent for the Five Star Movement, 7.9 per cent for National Future, 6.9 per cent for Forza Italia and 5.5 per cent for Lega. The figures also reflect changes within Italy’s national political landscape, including competition between parties occupying overlapping areas of the electorate.⁸

Competition within Italy’s nationalist political movements introduces another variable into the country’s political environment. The relationship between Lega and emerging political competitors raises questions about party organisation ahead of the next parliamentary election. The consequences for their European affiliations would depend on the parties’ own decisions and any changes in parliamentary representation.

Italy is consequently relevant to a broader European analysis in two respects. It demonstrates the possibility of continued cooperation between separate European political families, while also illustrating the domestic political considerations that a hypothetical merger would have to accommodate. The relationship between Meloni’s ECR and Salvini’s Patriots is therefore an institutional issue in its own right, rather than evidence that their European parliamentary groups have already agreed to unite.

Spain and Poland: Coalition Politics and the Future of European Party Alliances

Spain and Poland introduce two further examples of the relationship between national government formation and European political affiliations. Both countries operate parliamentary systems in which electoral results must be translated into workable governing arrangements. Consequently, the European implications of their approaching elections will depend not only on votes but also on the political agreements negotiated afterwards.

In Spain, the Partido Popular (PP) belongs to the EPP, while Vox is affiliated with the Patriots for Europe. A 40dB survey conducted between 31 August and 2 September 2026 recorded 32.4 per cent for the PP, 27.6 per cent for the governing Socialist Party and 17.8 per cent for Vox. However, polling organisations have produced different measurements, underlining the limitations of interpreting one survey as an electoral forecast.⁹

The relationship between the PP and Vox is particularly relevant to the wider European discussion. Any future national coalition agreement involving the two parties would represent cooperation between members of different European parliamentary groups. Such cooperation would not automatically change either party’s European affiliation, but it could become relevant to subsequent negotiations between their respective political families.

Poland presents a different configuration. President Karol Nawrocki, associated with Law and Justice (PiS), serves alongside Donald Tusk’s government. Civic Coalition is affiliated with the EPP, whereas PiS belongs to the ECR. Other Polish political formations occupy distinct positions within the country’s nationalist and conservative political landscape.

The September 2026 polling environment demonstrates the importance of this fragmentation. A Social Changes survey published on 14 September recorded 30.4 per cent for Civic Coalition, 25 per cent for PiS, 11.5 per cent for Konfederacja and 8.9 per cent for Konfederacja Korony Polskiej. Other surveys reported materially different levels of support, reinforcing the importance of considering several measurements when analysing possible parliamentary configurations.¹⁰

Poland’s next parliamentary election will be relevant to the relationship between national governing coalitions and European party families. However, Polish nationalist and conservative parties should not be treated as members of a single European political group. Their different affiliations and political positions would have to be addressed separately in any discussion of parliamentary realignment.

Taken together, developments in France, Italy, Spain and Poland illustrate several distinct possibilities: changes in national leadership, continued cooperation between parties affiliated with different European groups, the formation of new national coalitions and the potential reconsideration of European parliamentary affiliations. None of these developments automatically entails the others. Nevertheless, their interaction could become an important subject of European political negotiations before the end of the current parliamentary mandate.

A Mid-Term Parliamentary Realignment: Could the Political Groups Unite Before 2029?

The European Parliament’s institutional rules introduce an important possibility that is not dependent on the next European elections. Political groups can be established at any point during a parliamentary term, provided they meet the minimum requirement of 23 members drawn from at least seven EU member states. Consequently, a merger involving existing parliamentary groups or the establishment of a new group incorporating their constituent delegations could take place before 2029.¹¹

The institutional possibility becomes particularly relevant when examining three groups currently operating separately: the Patriots for Europe, the European Conservatives and Reformists and Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN). The AfD belongs to the latter, while France’s Rassemblement National and Hungary’s Fidesz are affiliated with the Patriots. Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia and Poland’s PiS belong to the ECR. These affiliations reflect distinct political organisations, leadership arrangements and policy positions.

The Parliamentary Arithmetic of a Hypothetical Merger

European Parliament: Seat distribution at the constitutive session in July 2024

Political group	Seats
Patriots for Europe (PfE)	84
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)	78
Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN)	25
Hypothetical combined group	187
European People’s Party (EPP)	188

Source: European Parliament, 2024 European Election Results: Constitutive Session and Political-Group Distribution. Official data.

Caption: A hypothetical merger of the PfE, ECR and ESN would have brought together 187 MEPs based on the July 2024 parliamentary composition, compared with the EPP’s 188 seats. The figures are historical and illustrate the potential significance of parliamentary reorganisation. They do not represent current seat totals or an electoral forecast.

Historical comparison based on official European Parliament data. These figures are not current seat totals or a forecast.¹²

This historical comparison illustrates the potential significance of parliamentary organisation. It also demonstrates why a hypothetical merger should be distinguished from the separate electoral performance of the participating national parties. A change in parliamentary affiliation could alter the size of a recognised political group without any immediate increase in the total number of elected representatives belonging to the parties concerned.

Nevertheless, the merger of these three formations would require more than agreement about parliamentary arithmetic. Their national delegations would have to negotiate questions of leadership, political priorities, internal governance and differences over substantive policies. Relations with Russia, European integration, economic policy and national sovereignty are among the issues on which the participating parties have expressed differing positions.

An alternative arrangement would be continued cooperation between separate political groups. Such cooperation already occurs in the European Parliament, where political majorities vary according to the legislative proposal under consideration. Reporting published in September 2026 documented instances of cooperation involving the EPP and groups to its right on migration and environmental legislation, demonstrating that parliamentary cooperation does not depend on formal organisational unification.¹³

Germany’s political developments could become relevant to either arrangement. A federal leadership change or an early parliamentary election would not automatically reorganise European political groups, but it could change the political environment in which Germany’s national parties negotiate their European relationships. Such developments could coincide with negotiations among parties elsewhere in Europe. However, the existence of these institutional possibilities should not be confused with evidence that a comprehensive merger has been agreed or that negotiations involving all three groups are under way.

Ursula von der Leyen and the Possibility of Another Motion of Censure

A parliamentary realignment would also raise questions about the political relationships underpinning Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission. The Commission president’s continued tenure is governed by the EU’s institutional framework, including the European Parliament’s power to adopt a motion of censure against the Commission as a whole.

The Patriots have already used this procedure. On 22 January 2026, the European Parliament rejected a motion submitted by the group concerning the EU-Mercosur trade agreement. The motion received 165 votes in favour and 390 against, with 10 abstentions. The outcome provides a documented example of the difference between initiating a motion and obtaining the parliamentary support required for its adoption.¹⁴

The applicable rules establish two separate thresholds. A motion of censure may be submitted by one tenth of Parliament’s component members, currently 72 MEPs. Its adoption requires a two-thirds majority of votes cast, representing a majority of Parliament’s component members. These conditions mean that a group possessing sufficient members to submit a motion would not necessarily be able to secure its adoption.¹⁴

A hypothetical merger of the Patriots, ECR and ESN would therefore have two different institutional implications. It could increase the collective representation and organisational resources of a single parliamentary group, but adoption of a motion of censure would still depend on support from a substantially broader parliamentary coalition. The differences between submission and adoption remain central to any assessment of the Commission’s parliamentary position.

Changes in national leadership introduce an additional, indirect dimension. New presidents and prime ministers could influence discussions within the European Council and the political priorities pursued by their national parties. However, they would not acquire control over the votes of their countries’ MEPs. Nor would national government changes automatically terminate the European Commission’s mandate.

If the European Parliament were to adopt a motion of censure, the Commission would be required to resign collectively. The nomination and election of a new Commission president would then involve the relevant procedures and voting requirements established by the EU treaties. Consequently, a hypothetical parliamentary realignment, another motion of censure and an early termination of the Commission’s mandate represent three separate developments, each requiring its own political decisions and institutional conditions.¹⁴ ¹⁵

The 2029 European Elections: Electoral Change and Parliamentary Organisation

The next European elections introduce a further dimension to this analysis. Unlike national elections or parliamentary reorganisations during the current term, the 2029 elections will determine a new distribution of elected representatives across the European Union. Subsequent decisions by national delegations will determine the composition of the Parliament’s political groups.

The electoral developments of 2026 and 2027 may provide information about changes in national voting behaviour, but they cannot be translated directly into future European parliamentary seats. Turnout, electoral systems, candidate selection, national campaign issues and the distribution of seats between member states will all influence the eventual parliamentary composition.

For the EPP, the relevant questions concern both the electoral performance of its constituent national parties and its capacity to maintain parliamentary cooperation with other groups. For the Patriots, ECR and ESN, an additional consideration is whether their national delegations retain their existing affiliations, establish a common parliamentary organisation or pursue looser forms of cooperation. These alternatives would produce different institutional arrangements even if the parties’ combined electoral representation remained unchanged.

A further distinction concerns the relationship between party families and parliamentary groups. Although closely connected, European political parties and European Parliament political groups are legally and organisationally distinct. The creation of a common parliamentary group would not necessarily require the participating parties to dissolve their existing European political parties or adopt an identical national political programme.¹¹

Consequently, the potential reorganisation of the European Parliament must be examined on two separate timelines. The first concerns decisions taken by serving MEPs during the current legislative term. The second concerns the electoral mandates and subsequent political affiliations established after the 2029 European elections. Developments along either timeline could affect parliamentary cooperation, but their institutional mechanisms differ.

Conclusion: Europe’s Political Transformation May Follow More Than One Timetable

Germany’s regional elections and Europe’s approaching national electoral cycle raise several interconnected institutional questions. The position of Friedrich Merz and the CDU, France’s presidential transition, Italy’s coalition politics and future parliamentary contests in Spain and Poland will each provide information about the development of Europe’s national party systems. Their consequences for EU decision-making will depend on the political relationships established within and between the Union’s institutions.

The European Parliament’s rules introduce a possibility extending beyond the national electoral calendar. A restructuring of existing political groups could occur during the current legislative term, independently of the 2029 European elections. A hypothetical merger involving the Patriots for Europe, ECR and ESN would constitute a significant organisational change, although its feasibility would depend on political agreements among their constituent national delegations.

Such a restructuring could also affect relations with the EPP and the parliamentary environment surrounding the European Commission. Nevertheless, a change in the relative size of parliamentary groups, the adoption of a motion of censure and the appointment of a new Commission are governed by different institutional requirements. None follows automatically from the others.

The central question for the remainder of the 2024–2029 parliamentary term is therefore not limited to the electoral performance of Europe’s political parties. It also concerns whether existing parliamentary affiliations and patterns of cooperation will change before voters next elect the European Parliament. Germany’s political developments, together with the approaching national elections in several major member states, will provide important evidence for examining these possibilities.

References

1. 1. Reuters. (2026, September 21). Erosion of Germany’s political centre exposes Merz’s weakening grip on power.
2. 2. Federal Returning Officer of Germany. (2026). Dates of future elections in Germany.
3. 3. Wahlrecht.de. (2026). German state election opinion polls. Polling database, accessed 25 September 2026.
4. 4. Wahlrecht.de. (2026). German federal election opinion polls. Polling database, accessed 25 September 2026.
5. 5. Federal Republic of Germany. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Articles 67–68.
6. 6. Ipsos BVA. (2026, September 5). French presidential election polling, September 2026.
7. 7. European Parliament. (2026). Political groups in the European Parliament.
8. 8. PolitPro. (2026). Italy: SWG parliamentary opinion polls.
9. 9. PolitPro. (2026, September 2). Spain: 40dB parliamentary election poll.
10. 10. Puls Wyborczy. (2026). Polish parliamentary polling data.
11. 11. European Parliament. What are political groups and how are they formed?.
12. 12. European Parliament. (2024, July). 2024 European election results: Constitutive session and political-group distribution.
13. 13. Le Monde. (2026, September 22). In the European Parliament, Germany’s CDU often relies on far-right AfD lawmakers to pass measures.
14. 14. European Parliament. (2026, January 22). Parliament rejects motion of censure against the European Commission.
15. 15. Council of the European Union. The role of the European Council in nominations and appointments.

Cover photo: AI-generated illustration by Central European Affairs (CEA), 2026.

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