The CDU Is Out, Merz Wants to Stay: What Could This Historic Defeat Set in Motion?

The collapse in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and the defeat in Berlin call into question both Friedrich Merz’s electoral strategy and his government’s performance. The chancellor may retain his position for now, but securing support for the reforms through which he hopes to regain voters’ trust could become increasingly difficult.

This is the first instalment in an analytical series examining the political future of the CDU/CSU in Germany and Europe. This article focuses on the immediate consequences of the electoral defeats, Merz’s room for manoeuvre and the stakes in the 2027 state elections.

Author: Szilárd Szélpál

The September 20 election in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania created an unprecedented political situation for the CDU: according to the provisional final result, the chancellor’s party secured 4.9 per cent of the vote and failed to enter the state parliament. The AfD finished first with 38.2 per cent, followed by the SPD with 35.5 per cent. The Left Party and the Greens also secured representation, with 6.5 and 5.7 per cent respectively. The BSW fell short of the threshold with 4.8 per cent. What makes the CDU’s defeat so consequential is the complete loss of parliamentary representation: a broad-based party governing nationally has become an extra-parliamentary force at state level. 

The Christian Democrats also suffered defeat in Berlin that evening. The Left Party took 25.7 per cent, overtaking the CDU, which fell to 18.8 per cent; the AfD secured 16.3 per cent. This makes it harder to explain the outcome solely through the particular circumstances of one eastern German state. Yet the two elections revealed discontent moving in different directions: the radical right came first in the northeast, while the left-wing opposition won in the capital. That does not, in itself, demonstrate a uniform nationwide shift to the right. 

The local CDU’s initial response combined shock with a search for explanations. Daniel Peters, the state party leader and lead candidate, described the result as a catastrophe and told ARD that his party had been squeezed out in a highly polarised campaign. This interpretation places the contest between Manuela Schwesig’s SPD and the AfD at the centre of the explanation: the CDU failed to establish a distinct role that voters considered indispensable. 

More direct criticism also emerged from within the local party. Eckhardt Rehberg, a former state party and parliamentary group leader, pointed to the SPD’s “obstruction” at federal level and Merz’s lack of empathy. He also called for substantial financial and organisational assistance from the national party. This raises the question of rebuilding: without a parliamentary presence, maintaining visibility, developing new political talent and reconnecting with lost voters becomes more difficult. 

Merz moved quickly to close down debate about his own position. Speaking shortly after the first projections, he called the result a “disaster”, acknowledged the absence of a favourable national political climate and made clear that he intended to continue as both chancellor and party leader. His response was to reaffirm his commitment to reform. He sees the success of those reforms as an antidote to the appeal of authoritarian politics. 

For now, the national leadership has signalled support. CDU treasurer Mathias Middelberg told Caren Miosga’s television programme that the party’s executive leadership stood united behind Merz and had primarily debated policy direction. Appearing on the same programme, SPD general secretary Tim Klüssendorf rejected the idea of simply carrying on as before and questioned whether the chancellor’s rapid statement had adequately addressed the message from voters. Public backing therefore protects Merz for the moment, but his coalition partner is already demanding a different emphasis. 

On the CSU side, Markus Söder had stressed the importance of government stability in the week before the election. He warned that, following the collapse of the previous coalition, the failure of another democratic government would benefit the AfD. He called for faster decisions, better government communication and tangible results. This position, expressed before the vote, also illustrates the sister party’s dilemma: the CSU has an interest in preserving its own political identity, yet it could hardly escape the consequences of a federal government crisis. 

The victorious AfD’s leaders interpreted the result as a mandate to govern. Leif-Erik Holm and Tino Chrupalla asserted their party’s claim to form a government, while Alice Weidel argued that it had displaced the CDU as a major party with broad public appeal. By contrast, Schleswig-Holstein’s CDU minister-president, Daniel Günther, congratulated Schwesig and attributed the CDU’s defeat to its being squeezed between the two main local contenders. Within the SPD, Lower Saxony’s minister-president, Olaf Lies, celebrated a comeback that he considered equivalent to victory. These are political interpretations: the AfD received the most votes, while the SPD may nevertheless retain the opportunity to lead the government. 

The parliamentary balance could allow an SPD–Left Party–Green coalition, while leaving the AfD without a coalition partner. This matters for the coming months: the AfD is likely to build its messaging around being excluded from government despite finishing first. For the other parties, the decisive consideration will be assembling a functioning parliamentary majority. The distinction between winning the largest share of the vote and being able to form a government could therefore become a source of political conflict in its own right. 

Berlin’s winner drew a different conclusion. Elif Eralp, the Left Party’s lead candidate, interpreted the result as a mandate to form a government and pursue her housing programme, including proposals to bring large housing portfolios into public ownership. This is uncomfortable for Merz because it demonstrates that a left-wing programme centred on living costs and housing can also mobilise dissatisfaction with the CDU. 

Political scientists commenting independently of the parties emphasised the erosion of the chancellor’s authority. Speaking on ZDF, Karl-Rudolf Korte interpreted even the unusually early timing of Merz’s statement as a sign of that decline. ZDF Heiko Giebler, a political scientist at Freie Universität Berlin, described Merz’s position as unstable but noted the absence of a clear, politically accepted successor. In an interview with WEB.DE, he urged the chancellor to move beyond announcements and deliver tangible results. He also cautioned against attributing the defeat entirely to Merz: Schwesig’s local popularity and the campaign’s two-way dynamic also mattered. 

The initial reactions therefore suggest a chancellor remaining in office with diminishing room for manoeuvre. A state election defeat does not alter the composition of the Bundestag. Removing Merz through a constructive vote of no confidence would require a successor whom a majority of its members were prepared to elect. Internal party dissatisfaction alone therefore does not amount to a change of government. 

Politically, however, the process could begin earlier. If the CDU’s state leaders conclude that Merz threatens their own electoral prospects, they may demand greater influence over the government’s direction. Separating the party leadership from the chancellorship, changing personnel or reshuffling coalition priorities could return to the agenda. These remain possible scenarios; public reactions do not establish that any such decisions have been taken. A transition would also be complicated by the fact that choosing a successor would mean choosing between different political currents within the CDU.

The most obvious government response would be to accelerate efforts to improve economic performance. Merz needs measures that businesses and households can actually feel: cheaper energy, simpler administration, investment projects moving ahead and more predictable employment prospects. The emphasis is therefore likely to shift towards results that can be demonstrated quickly. According to ARD analyst Tina Handel, Merz is trying to buy time until the economy improves and public investment begins to take effect. Yet stronger growth figures alone do not guarantee that voters will feel better off. 

Meanwhile, the biggest obstacle to reform may emerge within the coalition itself. The same ARD analysis points out that Schwesig strengthened her position by campaigning against Berlin’s pension policies. This could encourage the SPD to place greater emphasis on social protection. Merz, meanwhile, is promising his own party that he will push reforms through. The result could be a situation in which both partners want change, but in different directions: the CDU may demand faster restructuring, while the SPD seeks stronger social safeguards. A shared electoral threat could thus hold the government together while making its decisions harder. 

Relations with the AfD could trigger another internal dispute. Giebler expects renewed calls from eastern CDU branches to reconsider the “firewall” excluding cooperation with the party, but considers a breakthrough unlikely under Merz. The political risks run in both directions. Tougher rhetoric on migration and public safety may mobilise some voters while alienating others, and it does not answer concerns about housing or living costs. The two Sunday results suggest that the absence of a distinct, credible governing offer is at least as serious a problem for the CDU as its precise position on the political spectrum.

The next electoral test arrives in spring 2027. According to the Federal Returning Officer’s published calendar, Schleswig-Holstein and Saarland vote on April 18, North Rhine-Westphalia on April 25, Bremen on May 30 and Lower Saxony on September 26. Their results cannot be predicted numerically from the CDU’s current defeat in eastern Germany. Local leaders’ popularity, governing records and coalition options differ. 

For Merz, the performances of Hendrik Wüst in North Rhine-Westphalia and Daniel Günther in Schleswig-Holstein could be particularly consequential. Both have already been discussed as potential successors to the chancellor; in Wüst’s case, Welt has also examined the state-level and coalition risks of an early move to Berlin. Strong results achieved through their own political profiles could increase their influence within the CDU. Significant losses, however, could further weaken Merz while also narrowing the field of credible successors. A state-level victory would therefore not necessarily become the chancellor’s personal success, whereas defeat could easily trigger another national crisis.

In Saarland, Bremen and Lower Saxony, the question will be whether the CDU can offer a convincing local alternative while governing nationally. For the AfD, the coming year could test its ability to turn its current momentum into votes in western Germany. For the Left Party, it could reveal whether Berlin’s housing and social-policy message works elsewhere. Both possibilities depend on local conditions. The latest results may provide political momentum, but they cannot replace local organisation, credible candidates and answers to state-specific problems.

Merz therefore has a narrow political opportunity before spring 2027: to turn promises of reform into results for which his own party remains willing to bear the costs of coalition government. If he succeeds, September’s defeat could remain a turning point he survived. If the coalition continues to attract attention mainly through its internal disputes, more CDU figures may begin to consider whether replacing the leadership before the next elections would be the smaller risk.

The question facing German Christian Democracy also has European significance: how can a centre-right mass party preserve its ability to govern when its voters are being courted simultaneously by the radical right and a left mobilising social discontent? The next article in this series will examine how the CDU/CSU might respond, and how its choice of direction could influence Germany’s role in the EU and the political future of the European centre-right.

References

1. BILD. (2026, September 21). CDU: Was nach dem Wahl-Desaster in der Merz-Sitzung passierte. 
2. Die Bundeswahlleiterin. (n.d.). Künftige Wahltermine in Deutschland. Retrieved September 21, 2026.
3. Handel, T. (2026, September 20). Nach den Landtagswahlen: Merz spielt auf Zeit. tagesschau.de. 
4. Illner, M. (2026, September 21). Politologe: „Hoffentlich wird Merz jetzt eines bewusst“ [Interview with Heiko Giebler]. WEB.DE. 
5. Norddeutscher Rundfunk. (2026, September 21a). Liveticker Wahl MV: AfD vorn, SPD auf Platz zwei, CDU raus [Live blog]. 
6. Norddeutscher Rundfunk. (2026, September 21b). Reaktionen zur Wahl: SPD feiert Aufholjagd, AfD sieht Regierungsauftrag. 
7. Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg. (2026, September 20). Reaktion Elif Eralp auf Wahlergebnis | Wahl in Berlin [Video]. ARD Mediathek. 
8. Schubert, K. (2026, September 21). Wahl in Berlin: Linke klar vor CDU – schwierige Regierungsbildung erwartet. ZDFheute. 
9. tagesschau.de. (2026, September 20). Daniel Peters, CDU Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: „Wir wurden hier in dem hoch polarisierten Wahlkampf zerrieben“ [Video]. 
10. WELT. (2026, September 13). Söder und Kretschmer warnen vor Scheitern der Regierung. 
11. WELT. (2026, September 21). Vorläufiges Ergebnis: AfD siegt in MV – Debakel für die CDU. 
12. WELT. (n.d.). Warum die Merz-Krise für Kanzler-Reserve Wüst ungelegen kommt. Retrieved September 21, 2026.
13. ZDFheute. (2026, September 20a). „Ein Desaster“: Merz reagiert auf das CDU-Wahlergebnis. 
14. ZDFheute. (2026, September 20b). Korte: Merz leidet unter „Autoritätsverfall“ [Video]. 
15. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art. 67. (n.d.). Gesetze im Internet. 

Cover photo: AI-generated illustration by Central European Affairs (CEA), 2026.

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