No Reconciliation Without Accountability in Hungary

There can be no meaningful reconciliation in Hungary while Viktor Orbán remains untouched by legal and political accountability.

That is the blunt reality emerging from voices around Péter Magyar and the broader political shift now underway. Calls for “national unity” ring hollow, critics argue, if they are not accompanied by a clear reckoning with the past.

Author: Balazs Lang

Reconciliation, in this view, is not a rhetorical gesture, it is a consequence of justice. Orbán’s acknowledgment of electoral defeat was inevitable. What followed was not. He has not stepped down from party leadership, nor has he accepted responsibility for a political era that, his opponents argue, reshaped Hungary’s institutions, public discourse, and international standing in deeply damaging ways.

The expectation that such a political network could simply transition into a standard parliamentary opposition is, to critics, untenable. It risks normalizing a system they describe as fundamentally corrosive, one that extended far beyond conventional governance into the consolidation of power, influence over media, and the redirection of public resources.

At the heart of the argument lies a simple principle: accountability is not optional in a democracy. Parliamentary immunity, often defended as a safeguard of political independence, becomes indefensible when used as a shield against serious allegations. 

Critics point out the inconsistency of a system that has, in the past, shown willingness to strip opponents of such protections while preserving them for those in power.

The recent electoral mandate is widely interpreted by supporters of change as a rejection not only of a government, but of an entire governing model. That mandate, they argue, carries obligations. 

Chief among them is ensuring that the conditions which enabled alleged abuses cannot be recreated.

The charges leveled against Orbán’s era are sweeping: the fostering of division, the erosion of public trust, controversial public spending decisions, and the entrenchment of a political-economic elite. Whether each of these claims withstands legal scrutiny is a matter for independent institutions, but the demand is clear: they must be tested.

International precedent offers no shortage of examples. Ivo Sanader and Adrian Năstase were both imprisoned on corruption charges. Geir Haarde was held accountable in the aftermath of economic collapse. François Fillon was convicted over misuse of public funds. Even the controversial case of Yulia Tymoshenko underscores how central the question of political accountability has become across Europe.

Hungary, critics argue, cannot be an exception. There is, of course, a pragmatic counterpoint. The incoming leadership faces an immense governing burden. 

Rebuilding institutions, stabilizing the economy, and restoring international credibility will require time, focus, and political capital. But even those urging patience on policy warn against delay where accountability is concerned.

Justice postponed, they argue, is justice denied and politically destabilizing in its own right.

The deeper issue is not vengeance, but legitimacy. A democracy cannot credibly claim renewal if those accused of undermining it remain central actors within it. Nor can reconciliation take root if it asks victims – real or perceived – to simply move on without acknowledgment or consequence.

This is the line now being drawn: reconciliation is possible, but only after accountability. Not instead of it.

Anything less risks turning a political transition into little more than a change of faces, while leaving the underlying system intact.

Cover photo credit: Balazs Lang

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