The Diplomacy of Reciprocity: Diplomatic Expulsions Across Africa in 2026

Expelling diplomats is one of the oldest and most conspicuous ways for states to express their displeasure. The recent diplomatic dispute between Hungary and Russia made headlines in Budapest, but several parts of Africa have witnessed far more serious diplomatic confrontations throughout 2026. Ambassadors have been forced to leave their posts, diplomatic missions have closed, and some countries have severed relations altogether. The declaration of diplomats as persona non grata has become a visible feature of the geopolitical realignment taking place across parts of the continent.

Author: Dr. Georges Suha

Reciprocity is one of diplomacy’s most established principles. When one country expels a diplomat, the other generally responds in kind. Under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a receiving state may declare a foreign diplomat persona non grata without having to explain its decision. The legal procedure is relatively straightforward; the political consequences are often anything but. An expulsion may serve as a sanction for breaching diplomatic norms, a formal expression of political dissatisfaction, or a further step in an escalating dispute. International relations, after all, have developed remarkably sophisticated rules not only for mutual courtesy, but also for mutual offence. Events across Africa in 2026 suggest that diplomatic reciprocity can sometimes become less a means of preserving balance between states than a mechanism for gradually dismantling their relations.

From Pretoria to Addis Ababa: When Diplomats Become Unwelcome

One of the year’s first major diplomatic confrontations erupted on 30 January, when South Africa declared Israeli chargé d’affaires Ariel Seidman persona non grata and gave him 72 hours to leave the country. Pretoria accused the diplomat of breaching diplomatic norms, pointing to offensive remarks about President Cyril Ramaphosa published through official Israeli diplomatic communication channels, as well as Israel’s failure to provide adequate notification of visits by senior officials. Israel responded within hours. Benjamin Netanyahu’s government declared Shaun Edward Byneveldt, the South African diplomat representing his country in the Palestinian territories, persona non grata as well. Relations between the two countries had already deteriorated sharply over the war in Gaza and the proceedings before the International Court of Justice. The January expulsions were therefore less an unexpected rupture than another episode in an increasingly bitter diplomatic confrontation.

During the summer, a more difficult-to-explain diplomatic incident emerged between Ethiopia and Italy. Italian Ambassador Sem Fabrizi returned to Rome after only a few months in Addis Ababa. A decree issued by the Italian presidency on 30 July 2026 formally recorded his recall, but conflicting accounts subsequently appeared in the press. According to a report by Massimo Alberizzi, later discussed by Martin Plaut, the Ethiopian authorities had declared Fabrizi persona non grata. Subsequent reporting by the Italian newspaper Il Foglio, however, suggested that Rome may have recalled its ambassador precisely to avoid a formal expulsion. The circumstances remain unclear. What makes the episode particularly noteworthy is that the Italian government took no conspicuous retaliatory action, while Ethiopia’s ambassador was allowed to remain in Rome.

According to press reports, sensitive political and economic interests may have been involved. Some unconfirmed accounts claimed that Fabrizi had sought to tighten procedures at the embassy, particularly those concerning visa applications and the use of certain diplomatic channels. An Africa ExPress report, citing allegations made by an unnamed businessman, went further, suggesting that diplomatic connections had previously been used to bring spare parts, food, furniture and even weapons into Ethiopia without proper scrutiny, allegedly benefiting individuals close to the country’s political elite. These are serious allegations, and they have not been independently substantiated. They should therefore not be treated as established facts. Similar uncertainty surrounds the political consequences of changes to visa processing. According to published accounts, Fabrizi had sought to reorganise the handling of applications with the involvement of VFS Global, potentially upsetting established local interests.

The affair raises questions that extend beyond the circumstances of one ambassador’s departure. Through Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Mattei Plan, Italy is seeking to expand its political and economic presence in Africa, with Ethiopia among its important partners. The Fabrizi episode therefore invites a broader question: how consistently can the principle of diplomatic reciprocity be applied when a country’s wider geopolitical and economic interests point in another direction? Principles, naturally, remain of the utmost importance in diplomacy. Particularly until they encounter a strategic investment or a major foreign policy initiative.

Ethiopia and Eritrea: From Historic Reconciliation to Diplomatic Breakdown

One of the most serious diplomatic developments in Africa in 2026 came on 1 October, when Ethiopia announced the closure of its embassy in Asmara and declared ten Eritrean diplomats persona non grata. Those affected were given 48 hours to leave the country. Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic relations with Ethiopia altogether. The decision was especially significant given that the two neighbours had announced a historic reconciliation only eight years earlier, in 2018, restoring diplomatic relations and reopening their embassies. That rapprochement contributed to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s international recognition and his subsequent award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. Eight years later, one of the most tangible diplomatic achievements of the peace process had been dismantled.

The immediate background to the breakdown was the renewed escalation of armed conflict in northern Ethiopia. Addis Ababa accused Eritrea of supporting the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and associated armed opposition groups. Eritrea denied the allegations, while the already fragile security arrangements established following the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement appeared increasingly at risk. Fighting that resumed in late September affected not only Tigray but also areas of Afar and Amhara, raising the prospect of another major humanitarian emergency. According to a statement issued by Médecins Sans Frontières on 28 September, hospitals supported by the organisation in Tigray had treated more than 700 war-wounded patients by 25 September. Thousands of civilians were reportedly displaced, while humanitarian organisations faced restrictions on access to several affected areas.

The diplomatic breakdown also has a geopolitical dimension extending well beyond the Tigray conflict. Ethiopia has long regarded access to the sea as a strategic priority, particularly in relation to the Red Sea and the Eritrean port of Assab. Eritrea, meanwhile, views Ethiopian ambitions in this area through the lens of its own territorial sovereignty. Former allies have consequently found themselves on opposing sides once again in a region where armed conflict, access to ports and competition for regional influence are closely intertwined. Under these circumstances, the closure of diplomatic missions is more than a political gesture. It signals the narrowing of the institutional channels through which the two countries might otherwise manage their disputes.

Almost simultaneously, Ethiopia and Egypt became involved in a separate exchange of diplomatic expulsions. On 1 October, Addis Ababa declared Ahmed Moharam Ahmed Soliman, a member of the Egyptian embassy staff, persona non grata without publicly providing a reason, giving him 48 hours to depart. Cairo responded the following day by expelling an Ethiopian diplomat under the principle of reciprocity. Egypt described the original decision as regrettable and unjustified, accusing Ethiopia of repeatedly seeking to blame external actors for its domestic political and security crises.

One of the most persistent sources of tension between the two countries remains the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopia regards the hydroelectric project on the Blue Nile as a cornerstone of its economic development and energy independence. Egypt, by contrast, sees it as a potential strategic risk to its water security. The dispute centres on the management of water flows, arrangements during periods of drought and the absence of a legally binding agreement governing the dam’s operation. There is no established evidence that the October diplomatic expulsions were directly triggered by this disagreement, but the dam remains an important element in the deterioration of relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa.

The situation is further complicated by Ethiopia’s accusations that Egypt and Sudan have supported armed opposition groups, allegations both countries have rejected. Cairo has meanwhile strengthened its relations with Eritrea and sought additional regional partners to counterbalance Ethiopian influence. The diplomatic expulsions must therefore be understood within a wider geopolitical confrontation in which control over Nile waters, the strategic importance of the Red Sea and Ethiopia’s internal armed conflicts increasingly intersect.

West Africa: Sovereignty, Military Governments and the Retreat of Western Influence

West Africa has hardly been short of diplomatic incidents either. In early January, Benin expelled two officials attached to Niger’s embassy, including an intelligence officer and a police official. Niger responded by declaring the first counsellor at Benin’s embassy persona non grata, giving the diplomat 48 hours to leave. Relations between the two neighbours have remained tense since the military takeover in Niger in 2023, with mistrust deepening further after a failed coup attempt in Benin in December 2025. Although Cotonou did not formally accuse Niger of organising that attempt, suspicion between the two governments continued to grow. Here, too, the reciprocal expulsions were a symptom of an existing political and security dispute rather than its underlying cause.

In July, Burkina Faso joined the growing list of diplomatic confrontations when its authorities declared two European Union officials persona non grata, including the deputy head of the EU delegation. The diplomats were given three days to leave the country. The Burkinabe authorities did not publicly explain the specific grounds for the decision, but it followed a June resolution by the European Parliament criticising human rights violations and restrictions on political freedoms in Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou regarded the resolution as interference in its domestic affairs. The European External Action Service described the expulsions as unacceptable and unjustified and demanded an official explanation.

Burkina Faso’s decision fits into a broader geopolitical realignment across the Sahel. The military governments of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have increasingly framed their political agendas around national sovereignty and resistance to Western influence. Their reassessment of relations with former colonial powers and Western institutions has coincided with closer ties to Russia and the establishment of new regional political and security arrangements. Yet the appeal to sovereignty carries a notable contradiction in this political environment. While governments reject external interference, they also frequently treat international criticism of restrictions on domestic political pluralism and fundamental freedoms as an infringement of sovereignty. The result is a rather elastic understanding of the concept: broad enough to cover relations between states, but rather less accommodating when applied to the political rights of their own citizens.

In this context, diplomatic expulsions also become instruments of political communication. They can express dissatisfaction with foreign partners, mobilise domestic audiences and demonstrate the government’s determination to defend national sovereignty. Yet reducing diplomatic engagement does nothing, by itself, to resolve the political, economic and security problems that prompted the expulsions in the first place. It merely leaves one fewer person across the table with whom those problems might be discussed.

When Reciprocity Becomes Part of the Problem

The recent diplomatic confrontation between Hungary and Russia demonstrates that reciprocity has lost none of its relevance in Europe either. On 8 September, Hungary expelled ten Russian diplomats, citing activities incompatible with their diplomatic status. Moscow responded on 1 October by expelling Hungarian diplomats. The exchange marked a particularly significant change in Hungarian–Russian relations, although reciprocal diplomatic expulsions are hardly unknown in Europe, especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The significance of the African cases does not lie in any suggestion that countries across the continent are somehow more inclined to expel diplomats. Africa’s political and diplomatic landscape is far too diverse to sustain such a generalisation. Rather, the developments of 2026 illustrate how, in certain regions, diplomatic expulsions have become closely connected to security crises, interstate rivalry and shifting geopolitical alliances. In South Africa, they reflected another confrontation within an already strained bilateral relationship. Between Ethiopia and Eritrea, they accompanied a dangerous escalation of conflict. In the Sahel, they have become part of a broader reassessment of relations with Western powers and institutions.

The original purpose of diplomatic reciprocity is to preserve equality and mutual respect between states. But when every political grievance automatically produces a retaliatory measure, reciprocity can develop into a self-sustaining cycle of confrontation. A principle intended to regulate relations can then become a means of dismantling them.

Diplomacy does not depend on governments agreeing with one another. Its purpose is precisely to maintain channels of communication when they disagree. Declaring a diplomat persona non grata remains a legitimate and sometimes necessary measure, but its wider political consequences deserve careful consideration.

Perhaps the most important lesson from Africa’s diplomatic disputes in 2026 is that applying reciprocity consistently is relatively easy. What is considerably harder, once diplomatic relations have been severed, is explaining how governments intend to resolve the very disputes that prompted them to expel one another’s representatives in the first place.

After all, showing someone the door is the easy part of diplomacy. Negotiating with them afterwards becomes rather more complicated, particularly when you have already closed the entire embassy.

Sources

1. South African Government – Israeli Chargé d’Affaires Declared Persona Non Grata, 30 January 2026
2. Presidency of the Italian Republic – Recall of Ambassador Sem Fabrizi
3. Il Foglio – An Ambassador Bearing Bad News: The Strange Atmosphere Between Chigi and the Farnesina
4. Reuters – Reporting on the Ethiopia–Eritrea Diplomatic Crisis, 1 October 2026
5. Médecins Sans Frontières – Hospitals See Surge in War-Wounded Patients as Fighting Resumes in Ethiopia
6. Agence Europe – EU Denounces Expulsion of Two Members of Its Delegation
7. Reuters – Russia Expels Hungarian Diplomats in Tit-for-Tat Move, 1 October 2026

Cover photo credit: Dr. Georges Suha

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