Hungary’s Faith Diplomacy: The Rise and Realities of the Hungary Helps Program

In the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade (Külgazdasági és Külügyminisztérium) in Hungary there operates a State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians and for the Hungary Helps Program.¹ According to official descriptions, no other country in the world has a state or diplomatic body with this exact name or mandate.² The budget line for this Secretariat appears in the Ministry’s chapter of the state budget under the title “Hungary Helps Program” (HHP) and at the sub-heading of that name.³ For the current year, the appropriation is approximately HUF 5.6 billion.⁴

Author: Szilárd Szélpál & Dr. Georges Suha

It is asserted that this Secretariat is entirely superfluous. The explanation follows:

The idea of the HHP dates back to 2016 and originated with Zoltán Balog, then Minister of Human Resources (who later became an adviser to the President of Hungary and was implicated in the 2024 clemency affair).⁵ During his ministerial tenure he reportedly travelled abroad officially on 131 occasions, 36 of which were accompanied by Katalin Novák — initially his chief of staff, later a state secretary, who later became the President of Hungary.⁶ In his ministry, Balog created this unit—initially a deputy state secretariat—outside the foreign ministry’s traditional development apparatus. With hindsight, critics argue the institution did not come into being primarily to address global persecution but functioned as an instrument of governmental moral self-representation. While the government sought to legitimise the programme internationally and raise its visibility, it remained a national scheme rather than an EU instrument.⁷ The EU’s humanitarian acquis also centres on strict principles of humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality; among these, impartiality precludes assistance targeted solely on religious identity.⁸

In policy terms, “international development cooperation” (NEFE) is a long-standing, recognised field in Hungary, aiming to reduce poverty and inequality and promote peace, stability and sustainable development—built up in the 1990s and formalised with a 2020–2025 strategy.⁹

The government then sought to house domestic NEFE funds within its own sphere, serve identity objectives and turn this into a globally marketed aid programme. The ambition was to make HHP the de facto face of Hungary’s development cooperation.

Execution proved uneven. Prior practice—though modestly funded—relied on professional standards, transparency and multilateral cooperation. OECD’s recent review notes coordination and transparency challenges in Hungary’s aid architecture and partner selection that differ from typical EU practice.¹⁰

The introduction of HHP under Balog overlapped with a re-wiring of institutions. Although a NEFE division remained in the ministry, professional criteria gave way to political direction, and communications increasingly emphasised brand-style visibility. Academic and policy analyses have questioned auditability, EU-norm alignment and the programme’s fit with Hungarian interests—arguing it often prioritises ideological alliances over broader development partnerships.¹¹ Moreover, many donors exercise caution with faith-framed assistance because access and acceptance in crises often depend on providers being seen as politically and religiously neutral—an emphasis reflected in the EU’s humanitarian principles.¹²

Following a re-organisation in 2018, the unit was elevated to a state secretariat within the Prime Minister’s Office, with Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjén repeatedly associated with its political umbrella; Balog’s later role in the 2024 clemency scandal is well-documented.¹³ After a further re-organisation, the secretariat moved to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade, where it remains. A parliamentary briefing notes that, according to the 2021 budget outturn law, HHP spending that year totalled HUF 11.2 billion—well above the original plan.¹⁴

Diplomatic reframing also coincided with NEFE’s shrinking public profile. On the foreign ministry’s NEFE portal, the most recent news entry is from 2022; granular cost data, project durations and implementing partners are not systematically published.¹⁵ Implementation since 2019 has been coordinated by the Hungary Helps Agency, a state-owned entity closely linked to ministerial strategy; publicly available project pages typically highlight activities rather than per-project disbursement figures.¹⁶

Critics add that aid has sometimes appeared to follow narrative and geopolitical objectives—particularly in the Sahel—rather than needs assessments alone.¹⁷ Communications emphasise work in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans; there is comparatively little visible activity in East Asia or Latin America, and limited reference to China—either Christian or Muslim minority contexts—in official programme summaries.¹⁸ Unlike the prevailing EU practice of channelling humanitarian assistance via the UN system, the Red Cross/Red Crescent and accredited NGOs to preserve neutrality and access, HHP frequently works via bilateral state or church channels—an approach that has raised questions internationally.¹⁹

The record-setting tied-aid loan package to Chad illustrates the blurred boundary between humanitarian branding and export-linked state finance: in September 2024 the government approved a €200 million (c. HUF 80 billion) tied-aid framework through Eximbank.²⁰ Officials have also stressed that in such arrangements Eximbank executes the lending while line ministries manage policy visibility.²¹ In 2023 the Constitutional Court underlined that data relating to tied-aid loans constitute public-interest data, limiting blanket reliance on banking secrecy.²²

Transparency concerns are not limited to Africa. In February 2025 the government promulgated a financial cooperation framework with Laos covering up to $15 million for a water-management project—an amount broadly consistent with a multi-year, smaller-scale tied-aid envelope.²³

Overall, the programme has raised Hungary’s profile in debates on freedom of religion and belief and faith-based assistance. But the balance between messaging and measurable impact—as well as the relationship between national priorities and multilateral norms—continues to attract scrutiny in academic and policy literature.²⁴

Bibliography (corresponding to index numbers in the text)

1. Government of Hungary – State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians and for the Hungary Helps Program (mission page), citing Government Decision 1829/2016. (XII. 23.) and the unit’s mandate. Kormany
2. Hungary Helps official programme page stating “we were the first in the world” to elevate the issue to public policy. Hungary Helps
3. Parliament, “Költségvetési fejezet – KKM: Hungary Helps Programhoz kapcsolódó támogatások” (budget table). cdn.kormany.hu
4. Ibid. (shows ~HUF 5,570.3 million for 2025; treatment here as ~HUF 5.6 bn). cdn.kormany.hu
5. Government mission page (2016 launch/mandate); Catholic News Agency coverage of 2016 creation. Kormany+1
6. Válasz Online (KARD) dataset and analysis of Balog/Novák official trips (131 total; 36 with Novák). valaszonline.hu
7. OECD DAC Peer Review (Hungary) noting aid architecture; government programme remains a national scheme, not an EU instrument. OECD
8. European Commission – DG ECHO, “Humanitarian principles” (humanity, neutrality, independence, impartiality). ECHO
9. NEFE2025: Hungary’s International Development Cooperation Strategy 2020–2025 (official portal). nefe.kormany.hu
10. OECD DAC 2023 peer review of Hungary (coordination, transparency and partner-selection issues). OECD
11. Paragi & Szent-Iványi (2024), academic analysis of HHP’s motivations, governance and alignment with aid norms. Aston Publications Explorer
12. European Commission – DG ECHO, “Humanitarian principles” (neutrality/impartiality as access conditions). ECHO
13. 2018 elevation to PMO (Government site); parliamentary record; investigative reporting on Balog’s role in the 2024 clemency affair and subsequent resignation. Kormany+2Országgyűlés+2
14. Academic paper noting the 2022 transfer to MFA; Parliament Information Note (2023) citing HUF 11.2 bn HHP spending in 2021. Aston Publications Explorer+1
15. Official NEFE portal—latest news item dated 2022; newsletter archive likewise ends in 2022. nefe.kormany.hu+1
16. Hungary Helps Agency site (organisational overview; project/news pages typically without per-project disbursements). Hungary Helps
17. Hungary’s Sahel/Chad engagement—official and press reporting on Chad missions and frameworks. Hungary Today+1
18. Hungary Helps home and thematic pages emphasising Middle East/Sub-Saharan focus; limited references to China/Asian Muslim minorities in official summaries. Hungary Helps+1
19. EU humanitarian delivery model via accredited partners (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent, NGOs). Hungarian Conservative+1
20. Government’s €200 m (≈HUF 80 bn) tied-aid loan framework for Chad (TELEX; Szeged.hu; Daily News Hungary/MTI). telex+2Szeged.hu+2
21. Constitutional Court documentation noting Eximbank’s role as tied-aid lender (legal framing of roles). Amazon Web Services, Inc.
22. Constitutional Court materials confirming public-interest nature of tied-aid-related data (ABH 2023/Official Gazette summary). magyarkozlony.hu
23. Hungarian Official Gazette, 11/2025. (II. 18.) Korm. rendelet: financial cooperation framework with Laos; sets tied-aid envelope up to USD 15 m. magyarkozlony.hu
24. Paragi & Szent-Iványi (2024), scholarly critique on balance of messaging vs. measurable impact and multilateral alignment. Aston Publications Explorer

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