Out of Africa: Hungary’s Faltering Continental Strategy

Hungary’s widely publicised “Southern Opening” has failed to translate lofty promises into real influence on the African continent. Officially, Budapest insists that a stable Africa is indispensable for global peace, yet in practice the driving forces behind its policy are migration control and domestic vote-winning, while genuine political partnership remains largely rhetorical.

Author: Dr. Georges Suha

Hungary’s Sudden Embrace of Chad Raises Eyebrows at Home and Abroad

The Hungarian public has been stirred by the government’s unexpected pivot toward Chad, where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is building a strategic partnership with the country’s authoritarian leader, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno. In a move that surprised many, Hungary offered to deploy troops to replace the withdrawing French forces, signaling a new and assertive presence in the Sahel region.

Historically, Hungary has had no meaningful ties with Chad, prompting analysts to view the sudden engagement as more than coincidental—especially in light of Russia’s growing influence in the region and Orbán’s well-known affinity for Vladimir Putin. The partnership includes a €200 million development loan, but what truly sparked outrage was the reallocation of Hungarian budgetary funds originally earmarked for Ukraine under the European Peace Facility. In January, Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó proudly announced that the funds would instead be directed to Chad, citing the need to curb migration pressure—an argument that appears unconvincing, given the near-total absence of Chadian migrants in Europe.

Adding to the controversy, a government-linked water infrastructure company consortium has surfaced in Chad and, simultaneously, secured a €50 million project in Tanzania—both financed from Hungarian public funds. The Chadian venture grew even more controversial when it emerged that one of the key figures behind the diplomatic outreach was none other than the Prime Minister’s son, who reportedly went to great lengths to conceal his involvement.

This new African engagement has reignited debate over Hungary’s foreign policy in the region, forcing a broader reckoning with the motivations and mechanisms behind its so-called “Africa strategy.”

Narrow Economic Footprint, Tied Loans

Today, Hungary maintains just six embassies across Africa—a stark contrast to Austria’s twelve, the Czech Republic’s nine, Romania’s eight and Serbia’s five. This modest diplomatic footprint undercuts Hungary’s credibility and limits its access to emerging markets. Even the agricultural and digitalization projects championed by the government appear calibrated more to serve Hungarian contractors—often under tied-loan arrangements—than to meet local needs.

The historical record offers few lessons for current policymakers. In the 1970s, Hungary sought to build ties with newly independent African states through solidarity with the Non-Aligned Movement, providing tractors, medical and technical advisers, and cultural-academic exchanges. By the 1980s, however, Comecon’s financial collapse and a severe foreign-currency shortage curtailed those initiatives. After the fall of communism, most bilateral programs froze; only those African alumni of Hungarian universities preserved personal connections. Today’s policymakers have seldom leveraged alumni networks of African graduates from Hungarian universities, forfeiting a ready-made cadre of interlocutors.

Policy Missteps and the Road Ahead

Orbán’s official priorities—economic opportunity, migration prevention and protection of Christian communities—remain disconnected from on-the-ground realities. Sub-Saharan trade still accounts for under 0.3 percent of Hungary’s exports, well below the EU average of roughly 1.1 percent. The lion’s share of Hungary’s official development assistance, about 65 percent, flows as tied loans to firms with government ties; the remainder is earmarked for humanitarian relief. Those loans frequently carry above-market costs and rarely reflect genuine local demand.

 Efforts to curb migration amount to little more than political theater, producing no measurable border-management gains or durable regional cooperation. Likewise, humanitarian aid targeting Christian minorities in Africa has drawn criticism in Brussels for breaching EU principles of neutrality and non-discrimination.

If Hungary is to recalibrate, it must commit to sustained diplomatic staffing, untied financing aligned with African development plans and genuine policy dialogue that elevates African stakeholder voices.

Towards a Credible Africa Strategy

Sparse embassy openings—often one-person posts or honorary consulates—do little to foster long-term engagement or reshape public perceptions at home. Indeed, among ordinary Hungarians Africa evokes images of failed deals with Chad’s dictatorship, suspicions of Russian influence and a string of water-infrastructure scandals from Tanzania to Rwanda, rather than prospects for partnership.

In the end, Hungary’s “Southern Opening” boils down to empty rhetoric and superficial gestures. A strategy driven by fear of migration and a narrow pursuit of profit cannot substitute for genuine cooperation. Real progress would require sustained political commitment, balanced economic investment and above all an equal dialogue that places African priorities on an equal footing with Hungarian interests. Until then, Hungary’s Africa policy will remain little more than a shadow of its own ambitions.

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Cover photo credit: Gemini