In the first part of the series, I outlined how the Hungarian Prime Minister has used public money to influence football teams and use football for his political advantage. But his playground is not only Hungary. Over the last decade, Viktor Orbán has turned football into a powerful international political tool, funneling millions of euros into foreign clubs, particularly in countries with Hungarian minorities. While these investments are often framed as cultural and sports diplomacy, they serve a much broader purpose: expanding Hungary’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

Author: Zoltán Kész

Football as a geopolitical strategy

Instead of engaging in direct political funding, Orbán has utilized football to project soft power beyond Hungary’s borders. By financing clubs in Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia, he has cultivated local political alliances, strengthened nationalist sentiment, and ensured loyalty from Hungarian-speaking communities abroad. These clubs, backed by Hungarian taxpayer money, often serve as proxy institutions reinforcing Orbán’s political agenda.

Credit: Gemini AI

Romania: Sepsi OSK and the Székely Land

In Romania, Orbán’s football influence is most visible through Sepsi OSK, a club based in Sfântu Gheorghe or Sepsiszentgyögy in Hungarian, the heart of the Székely Land. The team has received indirect Hungarian state support, with funding channeled through the Bethlen Gábor Fund and Hungarian-backed corporate sponsors such as MOL and OTP Bank.

Sepsi’s rapid rise in Romanian football has made it a symbol of Hungarian nationalism, as the club prominently features Hungarian players and branding. This has fueled tensions with Romanian fans, who view Sepsi as a foreign-funded entity rather than a purely domestic club. Beyond football, Sepsi’s growth aligns with Orbán’s political backing of Hungarian parties in Romania, strengthening his leverage in local elections.

A detailed analysis found that millions of euros have flowed from Hungary into Sepsi OSK, financing not only the club itself but also sports infrastructure in the region. This includes investments in youth academies and stadium upgrades, reinforcing Hungary’s long-term influence over Transylvania’s Hungarian-speaking community.

Slovakia: DAC Dunajská Streda and Hungarian identity politics

In southern Slovakia, DAC Dunajská Streda has become a hub for Hungarian national identity. Owned by Oszkár Világi, a close ally of Orbán and CEO of Slovnaft and Deputy CEO of MOL, DAC has benefited from Hungarian government grants, stadium renovations, and youth academy funding.

Matches at DAC regularly feature Hungarian flags and nationalist chants, reinforcing the club’s role as a cultural and political symbol. Orbán and his allies frequently attend games, using the club as a platform to strengthen Hungarian nationalist sentiment. These investments also support Slovakia’s Hungarian nationalist parties, ensuring continued influence in the country’s politics.

According to Atlatszo, the Hungarian government has poured billions of forints into DAC, directly funding its infrastructure and training facilities. This investment ensures that DAC remains a central institution in promoting Hungarian identity in Slovakia, serving Orbán’s broader political goals.

Serbia: TSC Bačka Topola and the Orbán-Vučić alliance

TSC Bačka Topola has emerged as a key beneficiary of Hungarian football diplomacy in Serbia. The Hungarian government has invested over €9 million in the club’s stadium, with additional funding from Hungarian oligarch-linked companies.

This investment serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it aims to strengthen the Hungarian identity in Vojvodina, a region with a significant Hungarian minority. On the other hand, it bolsters ties between Orbán and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who also leverages football for political influence.

It has been confirmed that TSC Bačka Topola has received large sums from the Bethlen Gábor Fund, further embedding Hungary’s presence in Serbia’s sports and political landscape. The club’s success ensures continued alignment between the Hungarian and Serbian leadership, reinforcing their strategic partnership.

Slovenia: NK Nafta Lendava and Hungarian outreach

Even in Slovenia, Orbán has found an opportunity to expand his influence. NK Nafta Lendava, based in Prekmurje, a region with a small Hungarian minority, has received Hungarian state-backed funding and sponsorships.

While Nafta Lendava is a minor club compared to others in Orbán’s football empire, its financial backing reflects Hungary’s growing presence in Slovenian politics, particularly among nationalist parties that align with Orbán’s vision.

Ukraine: Football diplomacy in Transcarpathia

Although Hungary has not directly invested in Ukrainian football clubs, Orbán’s government has used sports infrastructure and grassroots football initiatives to extend influence in Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia, Ukraine), a region with a significant Hungarian minority. Hungary has provided development grants to local sports academies, ensuring that football programs cater to Hungarian-speaking communities. Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Orban government had some symbolic sports projects, which aligned with Hungary’s broader strategy of maintaining strong ties with the ethnic Hungarian population in Ukraine. While these initiatives remain at the grassroots level, they have been met with skepticism by Ukrainian authorities, who fear that Hungary’s cultural investments are part of a larger effort to exert political influence in the region, and they seem to be right in claiming this.

Orbán’s football-related outreach in Ukraine may not match the scale of his club investments elsewhere, but it reflects a consistent pattern of using football as a tool for nationalist and geopolitical objectives.

Football as a political weapon

Viktor Orbán’s football empire is not just about the game—it is a carefully designed geopolitical strategy. Through targeted investments, he has expanded Hungary’s soft power in Central and Eastern Europe. He has secured loyalty from Hungarian communities abroad and strengthened alliances with foreign leaders, such as Vučić in Serbia.
By funneling taxpayer money (indirectly EU money) into these clubs, Orbán has turned football into a proxy for political and economic influence, reshaping Hungary’s relationships with its neighbors while avoiding direct EU scrutiny. His strategy, built on a mix of nationalism, economic leverage, and soft power, ensures that every goal scored by these clubs is also a victory for his broader political ambitions.

Cover Photo Credit: Gemini AI

Zoltán Kész is the Government Affairs Manager of the Consumer Choice Center and a former member of the Hungarian Parliament.